Shared decision making : Trade-offs between narrower and broader conceptions by Cribb, A. & Entwistle, V.A.









Shared decision-making: trade –offs between narrower and broader conceptions 

Shared decision-making approaches are often seen as a middle way between the two extremes of ‘paternalistic’ and ‘informed choice’ (or ‘consumerist’) models of clinical decision-making,1,2 and are generally seen as preferable to these. In paternalistic models, health professionals decide what is best for patients. The main concern about these models (and the practices that reflect them) is that they fail to respect patients’ autonomy and discourage the recognition and acceptance of patients’ responsibility. In ‘consumerist’ models, health professionals give information to patients who then make their own decisions. The main concern about these is that they fail to respect health professionals’ autonomy and to recognise their responsibility and accountability. (They may also underestimate many patients’ vulnerability and limited decisional capability). Shared decision making approaches seek to work with the autonomy and responsibility of both health professionals and patients. 

However, there are many variant understandings of shared decision-making3  that reflect different assumptions and have different implications. The ethical and other advantages that particular variants of shared decision-making offer in some domains are often accompanied by disadvantages in other domains. These trade-offs have been relatively neglected to date, but it is important that they are understood. 

In this paper we consider and contrast narrower and broader conceptions of shared decision-making. Our aim is to highlight the ‘ethical work’ that is done by these conceptions and to explore the tensions between them. We suggest that current conceptions tend to be on the narrow side, and argue that if shared decision-making is interpreted too narrowly, there can be a heavy price to pay for the ethical compromise between paternalistic and consumerist extremes. We stress at the outset that it is not our intent to argue against shared decision-making approaches in general. Rather our purpose is to consider the assumptions that underpin some narrow conceptions of shared decision-making, and to draw attention to the problematic implications of these. We will argue that broader conceptions of shared decision making are more appropriate in principle – although we will stop short of unqualified advocacy of these conceptions both because they need a more careful specification than has yet been developed for health care settings and because they have their own inherent problems. 

A narrow conception of shared decision-making
The narrow conception that we outline and critique is not intended to represent any particular published definition or model of shared decision-making in its entirety. Rather, it is a set of propositions that have been advanced or implied, separately or together, in various writings about, and efforts to promote, shared decision-making: 

1(a) Patients have preferences about healthcare interventions and future health states and (b) it is the job of health professionals to elicit these and take them seriously (at least in the context of decisions about healthcare interventions for which health professionals are responsible.)

2 This is because doing so (a) respects the autonomy of patients and (b) provides data relevant to determining what counts as a good decision, good care and good outcomes for that patient.

3 That professionals and patients can, and sometimes should, engage in mutual discussion and joint deliberation about patient preferences but that this process should (a) only take place if the patient wants it to (i.e. that they have a ‘meta-preference’ to this effect) and (b) focus on combining the evidence-based knowledge of professionals with the treatment and health state preferences of patients (ideally following exposure of the patient to the relevant evidence.)

In summary, our critique is that proposition 1 is unduly simplistic, and in ways that undermine the rationales for shared decision-making represented in proposition 2, and that lead to inappropriate limitations on professional-patient engagement as represented in proposition 3. We would contend that in some instances it can be respectful, serve good ends and be otherwise ethically legitimate for health professionals to question, challenge and influence the preferences of patients (including both ‘evidence informed’ preferences for particular interventions  and expressed or apparent preferences for not discussing their options and preferences). Phrased in these carefully qualified terms we do not imagine this contention will seem unreasonable. It may even seem non-contentious. It does, however, involve taking issue with the propositions listed above, and hence with some current understandings of shared decision making.





Proposition 1 has two elements: that patients have preferences and that, in the context of clinical decision-making, it is the job of health professionals to elicit them and take them seriously. (A fuller account would not just refer to ‘preferences’ but also to ‘beliefs and ‘values’ etc. but we are using ‘preferences’ for simplicity.) It would be foolish to assert that patients never have preferences or to deny that some of their preferences are relevant to clinical decision-making. People often have preferences relating to particular kinds of healthcare intervention and/or their possible outcomes (including their implications for  biography and well-being). These are widely recognised as relevant to decision-making, as are preferences relating to risk aversion or risk taking. So-called ‘meta-preferences’5 relating to processes and styles of professional-patient interaction and deliberation and decision-making are also likely to be salient, and we, of course, agree that where such preferences exist it is important that they are reflected in healthcare provision. This will usually require that health professionals have the skill and inclination to discover them and take them into account. 

However it is only sometimes the case that patients have clear and stable decision-relevant preferences or meta-preferences that are consistent both with each other and with the way the world is. Both illness and healthcare trajectories present patients with novel and evolving situations in which it might be properly be said that they do not know what they prefer or that they have multiple, and possibly competing or even conflicting, preferences. In addition the preferences patients do have may be based on a lack of understanding, or misunderstandings, about their health states or possible interventions.6-8 

In these circumstances it is misleading to think that health professionals who seek to take patients’ preferences into account need simply to listen to patients’ expressions of preference or skilfully ‘elicit’ their pre-existing preferences as if they were nuggets hidden (unmentioned) below the surface, and then to feed these as discovered unproblematically into a decision process. 

In other words proposition 1a should be broadened out. It makes sense to think of patients either having or developing or ‘constructing’ preferences, that may be more or less well-founded, and that may not form a single coherent set. If the goal is to make choices on the basis of reasons (including preferences) that will be sustained on reflection,9 people may need to find ways of ‘checking’ their preferences, identifying which are likely to be  more longstanding, or more ultimate (or which represent their ‘deeply held values’)10 and find ways of making trade-offs or otherwise reconciling different preferences (including different kinds and ‘levels’ of preferences). 

This suggests the need to make a knock on broadening modification to proposition 1b. It may be (part of) the job of health professionals to help patients construct (and so even to co-construct), check and prioritise their preferences in domains important for decisions for which health professionals have some responsibility6 – although both the need for and appropriateness of particular approaches to preference elicitation and/or values clarification is likely to be context dependent. 7 

Why patient preferences matter

Proposition 2 asserts that patient preferences ought to be taken seriously for both intrinsic and instrumental reasons - because doing so respects the autonomy of patients and because it provides data which is useful, or even necessary, for good decision-making. It follows from what we have said about proposition 1, however, that this second proposition needs careful consideration. Not all preferences seem to be of equal importance, and if we have any reason to suppose that preferences may be unstable, given inappropriate weight in decisions, or susceptible to being ‘trumped’ by other preferences –perhaps ones which are currently less conspicuous – then both the intrinsic and the instrumental rationale are problematic. 

The ‘respect for autonomy’ rationale needs further consideration for other reasons too. As Rebecca Walker has recently argued, what really matters in healthcare is respect for autonomous persons.11 In normal cases, this will entail respecting the preferences and choices of persons with capacity for autonomy, but this is not because health professionals are engaged in, or are necessarily capable of, discerning which preferences and choices are themselves ‘autonomous’. It may well be that some (or many) of the preferences and choices that patients express and make reflect some form of ‘compulsion’ or ‘weakness of will’, or would otherwise  fail to be ‘autonomous’. If we insist on the importance of respecting such preferences and choices it is because we decide that the demands of respect for persons as autonomous override our concerns about any shortcomings of these specific preferences or choices. We are not, that is, ethically bound, to respect preferences as in themselves expressions of autonomy,12 and there may be occasions in which the best means of respecting the person (and supporting their capacity for autonomy )13 is by questioning or even challenging their expressed or apparent preferences - as long as we stop well short of coercing patients or forcing particular choices upon them.

The point of questioning or challenging patients’ expressed or apparent preferences would be to help them question and challenge their own preferences as discussed under proposition 1 – i.e. perhaps to help them filter or order conflicting preferences, or perhaps to help them fashion and formulate new preferences (either by rethinking preferences or by forming preferences in areas where there was previously no discernible preference). One such case might be where a patient has some clear and stable preference which is about something arguably comparatively trivial with regard to their overall level of autonomy (e.g. a dislike of injections) but appears to lack a preference about more fundamental treatment directions which have large scale life-altering implications in the longer term. More generally professionals can, through experience of similar cases, have an understanding of factors which may come to seem salient to patients at future times and of common misconceptions about possible future events and states.14 By sharing these insights they may help avoid the obvious dangers of just focussing on any  immediate preferences that are proactively voiced by or easily elicited from patients. In short proposition 2 can only be sustained if we add a broader notion of what might count as both supporting and respecting autonomy to a more problematised notion of what counts as identifying preferences.

Broadly the same considerations apply to the instrumental justification as to the intrinsic one, namely that we can only decide on the value of preferences by discriminating between them. Patients’ preferences often provide useful data for improved decision-making because they can indicate what counts as a good treatment or as a good outcome from the point of view of a particular patient. However, while it is rational for health professionals who want to make good decisions to investigate and pay attention to what their patients seem to value or want,  not all preferences are ‘fit for purpose’. The preferences that are instrumentally valuable for decision-making are those with a reasonable degree of predictive validity, that is, preferences that provide a good indication of how patients will come to evaluate the interventions and possible consequences that the preferences are about. It may seem high handed and disrespectful for doctors to discount preferences that they have good reason to believe will fail this test but, purely from this particular instrumental point of view, if it were possible to make these judgements correctly and confidently, this discounting could be warranted.

When and what to negotiate

Proposition 3 relates to when health professionals should be negotiating with patients and what they should be negotiating about. The idea of doctors working with patients seems crucial to any shared decision-making approach, and we do not want to deny its importance. However, the processes of collaboration and/or negotiation that feature in some narrow conceptions of shared decision-making are heavily circumscribed, (as for example in proposition 3), and this, we think, can be problematic. 

Proposition 3 suggests that health professionals and patients should discuss healthcare options and deliberate about them together (a) only if the patient wants to and (b) by seeking to make a decision that reflects both research evidence about the effects of different options and the patient’s preferences (as informed or modified by patients in the light of the evidence base).

The (quite strong) emphasis that is sometimes placed on condition (a) reflects the importance that is often attached to respect for preferences as expressions of patient autonomy. Some accounts suggest that patients’ meta-preferences (relating to approaches to decision-making) are, or should be, considered first and/or given simple lexical priority over their substantive preferences (for particular interventions or the outcomes and outcome probabilities associated with these).5,15 For example, Jack Dowie, whose sophisticated account distinguishes between meta-preferences relating to professional-patient relationships, discussion agendas and styles or decision-making approaches, argues that patient’s meta-preferences should be elicited in advance of (or as a first stage in) a consultation, and thereafter followed.15 For the reasons we rehearsed when considering proposition 1, this is problematic. Even leaving aside the considerable practical problems of eliciting (and ordering) meta-preferences there seems no obvious reason to treat them as well-founded, stable and non-negotiable. And there are considerable dangers in doing so if certain expressed meta-preferences may be responded to in ways that preclude the possibility of attending to preferences about intervention options and outcomes. 

Of course, as with expressed preferences about intervention options and outcomes, there are other good reasons to accept patients’ expressed meta-preferences. It is on the whole likely to be more courteous and more effective for a health professional to go with the grain of what the patient wants in terms of communication and engagement – although the same arguments we rehearsed in relation to proposition 2a would cast doubt on this acceptance always being required by a principle of respect for autonomy. Expressed meta-preferences might reflect a lack of awareness that there are several reasonable courses of action, and that the question of which is ‘best’ depends on what an individual patient thinks about a particular issue. They might also reflect a lack of experience of having been given information and support that could enable meaningful participation in discussions. Both possibilities suggest further scope for autonomy-supportive checks or ‘challenges’ from health professionals to initial and apparently undeliberated meta-preferences – especially those that tend to work ‘against’ patient participation.  However, in flagging up the potential defensibility of such checks and challenges we do not wish to imply that enhanced participation is always to be preferred or that it does not have possible negative consequences.16

We have argued elsewhere that the nature of the negotiation or joint deliberation that is advocated in shared decision-making is relatively unspecified,17 but some specifications do emerge if we attend to the rationale behind narrow conceptions of shared decision-making, as for example represented by proposition 3b. Such accounts rest on a particular division of labour between health professionals and patients. They envisage each party bringing something specific to the consultation/negotiation, playing a defined role in it, and leaving it with their independence still intact. The usual assumptions are that the health professional has relevant specialist knowledge (including of research evidence about the effectiveness of interventions), the patient has his or her  preferences (including hopes and aspirations etc.), and three overlapping kinds of transaction occur. First, both parties share or pool their respective insights. Second, the patient may revise their preferences in the light of the specialist knowledge that is shared with them; and on hearing more about the patient’s preferences the health professional may have to cast the net wider to identify and rehearse more relevant options and associated evidence. Third, the two parties try to agree on a course of action that properly reflects both sets of insights. (On some accounts failure to reach such an agreement can still be compatible with shared decision-making, but may necessitate the patient seeking another professional to work with).2. 





Broader conceptions of shared decision-making: thinking about relationships

It is striking how different, and how much more restricted, the conception of dialogue built into narrow conceptions of shared decision-making, is from other familiar examples of dialogue. In areas where relationships are more open-ended, and roles less sharply separated – most obviously in friendships and also, for example, in parent-child and some teacher-learner relationships – it is often seen as desirable for both preferences and meta-preferences to be questioned and challenged. Indeed, in many instances, the relationship can properly be viewed as a context for exploring and questioning preferences such that we might say that one fails to be a good friend, parent or teacher unless one succeeds in doing this. 

Of course it is important to recognise that doctor-patient relationships are different from friendships, parent-child and teacher-learner relationships. But, as we have tried to indicate, a good case can be made for broadening ideas about shared decision-making in health professional-patient encounters too. 

There is support for this suggestion in the wider literature on clinical relationships and ethics. In their classic analysis of ‘four models of the physician-patient relationship’ Emmanuel and Emmanuel, who also cite examples of friendship and teaching, advocate for ‘the deliberative model’ as ‘Descriptively and prescriptively’ …’the ideal physician-patient relationship’ (p2225).18 This model involves doctors challenging and being prepared to co-construct patient preferences and could thus be considered to incorporate a broad conception of shared decision-making.

The examples of friendship and teaching illustrate that dialogue has fundamentally important purposes that extend well beyond the kinds of transactions envisaged within narrow conceptions of shared decision-making. In our conversations with our friends, children or students we do not confine ourselves to helping them to articulate their preferences or to questioning the factual assumptions lying behind or shaping their preferences. Rather – to simplify - we try to combine an emotionally supportive acknowledgement of ‘where they are coming from’ with a critical engagement with the things they affirm - including their expressed preferences. In doing so we constantly have to walk a very careful line but if we are doing this conscientiously we do not believe that our critical engagement is a threat to their autonomy but rather the opposite – it is because we care about them, and take their present and future autonomy seriously, that we are ready to take issue with what they say they want. In these cases we are unquestionably concerned that the conclusions and choices that our friends, children and students end up with are very much their own but this does not rule out a willingness to help them construct, re-construct and even co-construct their preferences through dialogue. It is in the nature of these exchanges that we risk ‘invading the territory’ of a friend, child or student, but because we are concerned to ‘meet’ them as people and not just as ‘contractors’, we aspire to be responsive to them with the full range of humanity and not just with practical or technical expertise. 

Taking this thought further, we can see that the contrasts and tensions between narrower and broader conceptions of shared decision-making largely a matter of differences in the ‘open-endedness’ of relationships between health professionals and patients.  ‘Open-endedness’ can relate to several dimensions, including: the time period over which the relationship and the ongoing discussion could and do take place; the flexibility/fixedness of role/function boundaries in the relationship; the depth or penetration of probes and discussions (for example whether they relate to preferences at quite superficial levels or to more longstanding or fundamental value orientations; and the scale or length of the ‘horizon’ which frames what is at stake i.e. how far is any discussion about the specific decision at hand and/or about whole ‘future life’ considerations. 

Generally speaking as we move from the less to the more open-ended kinds of relationships two things change: first, the individuals involved become less ‘substitutable’; second, the relevant notions of expertise broaden out. In narrower conceptions of shared decision-making, which rely on a relatively fixed and constrained view of the appropriate scope and function of dialogue, and which limit health professionals’ roles to the sharing of impersonal technically decision-relevant knowledge,  the health professionals involved are plausibly substitutable one with another. When ‘non-interference’ is emphasised (or required) substitutability can be seen as an indicator of success; but when the kinds of support associated with more ‘committed’ and open-ended relationships are valued, substitutability (and more so substitution) can equally well be taken to indicate a deficit. 

In less open-ended relationships it is possible, indeed often useful, to conceive of the knowledge being practised as essentially technical knowledge and of the practitioner as essentially following a protocol which anyone with the same kind of technical expertise could, in principle, follow. As relationships become more open-ended, more and more factors come into play, including an indefinitely large number of considerations connected to the personhood of both parties and the contexts of their lives. to refer to the need for intellectual and moral ‘virtues’ i.e. the qualities of character that enable us to respond to, and wisely balance together, multiple and often competing considerations.19

There are some real dangers in applying a more open-ended model of dialogue or collaboration to health professionals and patients. Substantial power imbalances in professional-patient relationships, along with the absolute or relative vulnerability of patients, are, rightly, often cited as threats to the autonomy of patients. It is in this context, and with the desire to protect patients from either straightforward abuses of power or more well-intentioned forms of paternalistic pressure, that the idealisations built into narrow conceptions of shared decision-making make sense. However this is also the nub of the inherent ethical and practical limitations of narrow conceptions of shared decision-making: the divisions of labour within these conceptions aim to make medical resources available to patients whilst at the same time protecting patients from medical power. But in protecting the patient from the risk of unwarranted interference, narrow conceptions of shared decision-making – at least as expressed in the three propositions discussed above – shut off some of the most important medical resources available, namely those that arise from the personhood of health professionals and the broad potential of supportive human relationships.

We are thus left facing the longstanding and recalcitrant conundrum that gives rise to the various competing ideals of relationships between health professionals and patients. How can the full resources of the (typically relatively powerful) health professional be made available to serve the interests of the (typically relatively vulnerable) patient without those interests being compromised or damaged as a result? How can patient’s clinical decision-making be supported by the health professionals involved in their care and protected from those health professionals at the same time? ‘Agency’ models of professional-patient relationships acknowledge the conflicts of interest that arise for health professionals when their employment and broader social responsibilities are taken into account, but these are not readily compatible with the kinds of partnership aspired to in shared decision making.19

Narrower and broader conceptions of shared decision-making respond to the conundrum in different ways. Narrow conceptions assume that the autonomy of the patient is located in their independently formed (and possibly revised) preferences. To protect the patient, they restrict the supportive role of health professionals in decision-making to their use and sharing of specialist knowledge, excluding wider checking, questioning or influencing. They secure the ‘half-way house’ status of shared decision making and forge the ethical compromise with a strict division of labour. 

We have suggested that broader conceptions of shared decision-making provide a useful ‘corrective’ by allowing for more open-ended and fully dialogical ways of relating. In these broader conceptions, the ethical compromise between unduly paternalistic and unduly consumerist approaches depends essentially on the skills and virtues of individual health professionals (including those relating to self-discipline) and on the creation of climates that can support the development and exercise of both professional virtues and patient capabilities. In practice, broader conceptions of shared decision making clearly ask a lot of healthcare providers, and particularly of individual health professionals as they work within particular clinical encounters. The tensions between narrower and broader conceptions of shared decision-making can partly be seen as tensions between ‘practice’ and ‘principle’. 

One of the reasons for the success of narrow conceptions of shared decision-making in practice is that – like informed consent regulations -  they foreground a crucially important anti-paternalist patient ‘protection’ agenda.21 It is also quite possible that the practical effects of even narrow conceptions can influence presumptions about good practice that help bolster an understanding of the importance of patient perspectives. But, as we have indicated, the ways in which narrow conceptions treat patients’ preferences and their ethical significance will not stand up to critical scrutiny. Narrow conceptions do not straightforwardly justify claims that shared decision-making is respectful of autonomy and improves decision quality. They also present an unnecessarily limited and misconceived picture of the role of doctors in decision-making. At the level of principle it seems that broader conceptions of shared decision-making win all of the main arguments. But, in practice, and given what we know about medical power and clinical norms, it is far from clear how often attempts to operationalise broader conceptions of shared decision-making would differ from unwanted paternalism.






In the end we suggest that the crucial protective agenda that motivates much advocacy of shared decision making is not best served by narrow conceptions of shared decision-making as exemplified by the propositions we have considered. It depends, first and foremost, on hard won and precariously held professional virtues. We need to identify practical steps that can move us in a direction that allows broader and richer conceptions of shared decision-making to be safely operationalised. The virtues that need to be cultivated and institutionally supported are likely to be analogous to those required for the ‘balancing acts’ of friendship or teaching that we discussed above; that is to say they involve finding ways of combining both patient autonomy and autonomy-supportive professional interference.
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